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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KAY J. LARSEN,
Plaintiff & Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 18198

JUDY LARSEN (THOMAS)

I

Defendant & Appellant.

BRIEF OF JUDY LARSEN (THOMAS)

NATURE OF CASE
This is a review of a Judgment entered by the Third
Judicial District Court following an Order to Show Cause, In Re
Contempt, for arrearages of child support due.

DISPOSITION BY THE DISTRICT COURT
The District Court entered a judgment in favor 0£
Defendant-Appellant and against Plaintiff-Respondent for a sum
equal to the child support accrued during the last eight years
less the payments made during the same periodr plus interest, costs
and attorney's fees, and stayed execution on the judgment so long
as $50.00 per month was paid thereon.
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·RELIEF SOUGHT BY JUDY LARSEN (THOMAS)
Defendant-Appellant seeks a review by this Court of
the law applied by the District Court for the computation of the
amount of the arrearage of child support due under the Divorce
Decree.

Defendant-Appellant seeks to have this Court modify the

amount of the judgment to correctly reflect an allocation, as of
the date of the payment, of each of the payments made by PlaintiffRespondent, to the oldest unpaid obligation, not barred by the
statute of limitations.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties were divorced in a decree of the District
court of Salt Lake County on the 7th day of March, 1967, wherein
De~endant-Appellant

was awarded the custody of the parties' two

minor children and Plaintiff-Respondent was ordered to pay the
sum of $75.00 per month per child as child support and $101.00
per month as alimony.

The original Divorce Decree was modified

by stipulation of the parties shortly thereafter, wherein,
Plaintiff-Respondent was to pay Defendant-Appellant the sum of
$50.00 per month per child and $150.00 per month as alimony.

It

was ordered that all payments were to be made through the Clerk
of the Court of Salt Lake County.

Alimony terminated on the 18th

day of July, 1971, upon Defendant-Appellant's remarriage.

Between

1967 and 1981, certain payments were made by Plaintiff-Respondent
as recorded in the records of the Court Clerk's Office.

On the

26th day of May, 1981, Defendant-Appellant brought an Order to ShOW
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cause, In Re Contempt seeking a judgment for the arrearages
accrued upon the child support order.
At the Order to Show Cause hearing the parties stipulated that the records of the County

Clerk's Office correctly

reflected all payments made by Plaintiff-Respondent under the
Divorce Decree, and Plaintiff-Respondent stipulated that he had
not allocated any of the payments to any particular portion of
the arrearage.
Defendant-Appellant provided the trial court with a
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES, including a full accounting
of the accrual of each of the child support and alimony installments and indicating every payment made by Plaintiff-Respondent
with an allocation to the oldest part of the debt due, not barred

by the statute of limitation.
The trial court entered judgment on the arrearage
giving Defendant-Respondent credit for all payments made in the
last eight years against the support obligation accrued for the
same period.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY INSTALLMENTS ARE JUDGMENTS AT THE TIME
OF ACCRUAL OF EACH PAYMENT AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS STARTS
TO RUN FOR EACH PAYMENT AT THE TIME OF THE ACCRUAL OF THAT PAYMENT.
Under a long line of Utah cases each child support or
alimony installment required by a divorce decree has been recognized as a final judgment at the time that it becomes due.
In Seeley vs. Park, 532 P.2d 684 (Utah, 1975), the
latest in this line of cases, this Court stated:
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Installments under a decree of divorce for alimony
or support of minor children become final judgments
as soon as they are due and cannot thereafter be
modified.
see Openshaw vs. Openshaw, 105 Utah 574, 144 P.2d 528 (1943) and
Beesley vs. Badger, 66 Utah 194, 240 P. 528 (1925).
The statute of limitations for an action on any judgment entered by a state court of the United States is found at
Section 78-12-1 and Section 78-12-22, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953),
as amended, and is for the period of eight years from date of
the judgment.
In the instant case there is a series of judgments,
the first dated on the 7th day of March 1967, with a new judgment accruing monthly thereafter, until suit was commenced on
this action on the 26th day of May, 1981.

The statute of limita-

tions for each of these judgments commenced to run on the date
that it became due and continued running for a period of eight
years.

Any installment which remained unpaid for more than

eight years from the date which it became due, was thereafter
barred by the statute of limitations.
POINT II
ALL SUMS PAID, WITHOUT SPECIFIC ALLOCATION, UPON A CHILD SUPPORT
OR ALIMONY OBLIGATION SHOULD BE APPLIED, AS OF THE TIME OF THE
PAYMENT, TO THE OLDEST PART OF THE ARREARAGE NOT THEN EXTINGUISHED
BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
The general rule of law is that payments made without
specific allocation are applied to the oldest debt then due.
This rule is set forth in 60 Am Jur 2d PAYMENT Section 91 as
follows:
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If debtor fails to direct the application of this
payment, and the creditor does not exercise his
right of application, the law will apply the
payment to the oldest debt unless justice and
equity demand different appropriation, or unless
the rights and equities of third persons are
involved.
This Court followed this rule of law in its decision of Seeley
vs. Park, infra, when on page 685 the Court stated:
The presumption is that a payment without specific
allocation is to be applied against the oldest
part of the debt.
See also Chudzinski vs. Chudzinski, 26 Ariz. App. 130, 546
P.2d 1139 (1976).
Nothing in the statement of this rule would allow
the application of a payment to obligations which, at the time
of the payment, were then barred by the statute of limitations.
60 Am Jur 2d. PAYMENT Section 101 states:
Where a voluntary payment is made before the
statute of limitations runs, but the payment is
not applied by the parties, and subsequently the
statute of limitations runs against part of the
debt, the rule is that the payment shall be
applied by the Court·according to the principles
of equity and justice and that, absent superior
equities compelling a different application,
justice and equity require the application to be
made first to the part of the debt whi~h is barred
and then to the balance.
From this statement it is clear that the time to judge
whether the application of the payment to a particular portion of
the obligation is barred by the statute of limitations is at the
time of payment.

See Young vs. Williams 583 P.2d 201, 206

(Alaska, 1978).

-5-
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This Court applied this rule correctly in the Seeley
case.

There the

Appellant, in addition to successfully arguing

for an eight-year statute of limitations, claimed he was entitled
to credit for payments against the accruals during the eight years
not excluded by the statute of limitations.

The

Appellan~

sought

to have the Court ·reduce the accruals during the last eight years
by the payments which he had made during the same period.

How-

ever, the Court affirmed the judgment in a sum equal to the
accruals during the eight years with no reduction for payments.
It seems clear the court allocated the payments made during the
eight years to accruals of the earlier period.
In the instant case, although the Plaintiff-Respondent
stipulated to the trial court that no allocation had been made
for any of his payments, he prevailed upon the theory which this
Court refused in the Seeley case.
In the Young vs. Williams, 583 P.2d 201, 205-206
(Alaska, 1978), the Supreme Court of Alaska decided a case
raising the same issues as the instant case.

In that case the

debtor-husband named Young advocated the same position as the
Plaintiff-Respondent in the instant case.

The Alaska·Supreme

Court stated:
The superior court held that child support payments were judgments at the time each payment
accrued. Thus, the applicable statute of limitations on actions to recover arrearages in child
support payments is that applicable for judgments,
which is 10 years.
In order to resolve the question whether support payments made during the
period from 1966 to 1975 should be credited against
support obligations for the same period, the
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superior court took evidence as to support
obligations and payments made for the period from
1961 to 1965. This was done because the superior
court concluded that "(a)ll sums paid or credited
shall be applied to the oldest arrearage" not
extinguished by the statute of limitations.
Since the total credit for all of Young's payments made in the period 1966 to 1975 was applied
to obligations which accrued prior to 1966, Young
received no credit against support obligations
owing from 1966 to 1975.
The Alaska court on page 206 continued:
Claiming that the period from 1961 to 1965 is now
barred by the ten-year statute of limitations
since this action was brought in 1975, Young
contends that no consideration should be given
to this earlier period. However, he advances no
legal support for this argument and we can find
none. The superior court properly considered what
support obligation Young had during the 1961 to
1965 period and what payments he had made against
it. Thus, by ascertaining what was still owing on
this debt during the period 1965 to 1975 the court
was able to compute the extent to which the payments Young made after 1965 were applicable to the
pre-1965 debt and to the post-1965 debt. The
application of a payment to the oldest outstanding
debt is to be computed as of the date the payment
was made and not as of when the suit was filed to
enforce the underlying judgment. Thus, although
the entire debt from 1961 through 1965 was barred
by the statute of limitations when this action was
brought in 1975, this was not the case when the
various payments were made by Young prior to 1975.
Those payments properly are to be credited against
the debt.
The California appellate court in Parhm vs. Parhm,
2 Cal. App. 3rd 311, 82 Cal. Rptr. 570, 574 _(1969) came to a
similar resolution-of these issues.

The trial court in Parhm

came to a position similar to that taken by the District Court
:inthe instant case.

The California court of appeals remanded

the case because they were unable to properly determine the

-7-
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extent to which the payments made during the period not barred
were entitled to be credited against the obligation now being
sued upon, lacking a complete accounting of the earlier period.

POINT III
ALL OF THE PAYMENTS MADE BY PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT DURING THE LAST
EIGHT YEARS SHOULD BE CREDITED TO OBLIGATIONS WHICH WERE NOT
BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WHEN THE PAYMENT WAS
RECEIVED BUT HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY BECOME BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS.
In the instant case Appellant provided a MEMORANDUM
OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES to the trial court which included a
full accounting of all payments made by Plaintiff-Respondent,
showing that each of these payments was properly allocated to
debts which were at the time of payment not barred by the statute
of limitations, but which subsequently became barred.

The

accuracy of this accounting has never been questioned by PlaintiffRespondent,- and is sufficient to allow this Court to amend DefendantAppellant's judgment to the sum of $9,600.00 (96 x $100.00).

CONCLUSION
The Court should follow the precedent contained in
Seeley vs. Park, infra, and the better-reasoned cases which
support the position that the allocation of payments to debts
is to be made as of the date of receipt of the payment.

This

result is in accordance with general Debtor-Creditor law, Utah
precedent and is consistent with the public policy to require
both parents to contribute meaningfully to the support of their
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children.

The holding which the Plaintiff-Respondent urged upon

the trial court has the effect of rewarding the delinquent payment of child support and would significantly reduce the relative
burden which the delinquent parent would bear to the total cost
of child rearing.

The delinquent parent should not be standing

in a better position vis-a-vis the custodial parent than the
ordinary debtor to his creditor.
This Court should modify the judgment in favor of
Defendant-Appellant_to the sum of $9,600.00 (96 x $100.00)
together with interest at the statutory rate, $175.00 for
Plaintiff's attorney's fees and $17.50 costs of Court, which
total judgment should bear interest at the statutory judgment
interest rate, and the Court should lift the stay of execution
on said judgment imposed by the trial court.
Respectfully submitted this 27th day of April, 1982.

A. HARDING
Attorney for Defendant-Appe
175 South West Temple
Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby

certify that I mailed, postage prepaid,

two (2) copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF JUDY LARSEN {THOMAS) to:
D. Kendall Perkins
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
525 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
on the 27th day of April, 1982.

A. HARDING
- Attorney for Defendant-Ap
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